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lowing a witness to be contradicted by proof of inconsistent statements without
having first called the statements to the witness's attention, at least where the
witness is testifying by deposition.1' The treatise also favors elimination of the
established federal rule limiting the scope of cross-examination to the subject
matter of direct examination.20 Yet despite a felt need for changes, Professor
Moore opposes any sweeping revision of the Federal Rules. He even frowns
upon most "clarifying" amendments. This view stems from his conception of
the Rules as the means by which district courts are provided with a relatively
simple procedural system under which a great deal of discretionary power is
lodged in the trial court.21 Thus, he feels that most alleged abuses under the
Rules will be best resolved by a more sensitive response of the district courts
to the problem of abuse and a correlative use of the extensive protective powers
... [they] now possess." 22 This preference for flexibility in federal procedure
is buttressed by a fear that "declaratory" or "clarifying" anendments may
create more ambiguities than they resolve.2 The action to date of the present
Advisory Committee on the Federal Civil Rules suggests that Professor Moore
is not alone in his views.
In short, the second edition of Moore's Fcdcral Practice represents the best
efforts of the professor to evaluate and summarize fifteen years of federal prac-
tice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The result of these efforts
is a scholarly and yet practical exposition of the principles of federal practice,
pleading and procedure, accompanied by an impressive collection of authorities
and an adequate, but not burdensome, historical background. For lawyers who
rarely visit the courtroom, the treatise will provide legal reading of exceptional
enlightenment and enjoyment; to their litigating brothers, its use is almost im-
perative.
ALBERT JENNE4
ONE MAN'S STAND FOR FREEDOm, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS. Edited by Irving Dilliard. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1963.
Pp. xiii, 504. $6.95.
JUSTICE Black is best known among the public for his strong support of in-
dividual freedoms. It is too seldom recognized, however, that he finds warrant
for the positions he takes not solely in his personal political commitment to
individual liberty, but also in his conception of what model our nation's funda-
19. The special necessity where testimony is by deposition arises from the fact that
the witness normally will not be present at the trial so as to enable reference to contradictory
statements as a foundation. 4 MooRE f 26.35, at 1693.
20. See 5 MooE 1f 43.10.
21. IA MooRE 1 0.504, at 5042.
22. 4 MooR 11f26.02 [3] at 1039 (referring specifically to criticism of discovery rules).
See also references cited supra, notes 14-15.
23. 1A Moona 11 0.528 [4], at 5632.
Member of the firm of Thompson, Raymond, Mayer, and Jenner, Chicago, Ill.
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mental document has constituted for society, and what basis for political action
the Bill of Rights commands. Black's decisions in the civil liberties area rest
on the cornerstone of his judicial outlook-the view that "it is a Constitution
we are expounding." Given his understanding of the society defined by the
Constitution, Black handles the particular controversies which reach the Su-
preme Court as problems to be dealt with by a process of tight judicial reason-
ing. It is this peculiar combination of a broad constitutional vision and a pene-
trating legal mind confronted by a case that makes Black's decisions as great
as they are.
Unfortunately, One Man's Stand for Freedom obscures both virtues. Dillard
has designed his book both for laymen and lawyers, promising a clear picture
of Black's thought. His organization and editing, however, emphasize Black's
praise of freedom and rhetoric of dismay.
The structure of the book must be set forth before we can understand how
Dillard has obscured the fact that Black's "stand for freedom" is, above all,
the work product of a great constitutional lawyer. The book starts with an
appreciation of the Justice by Dillard himself and then Black's James Madi-
son lecture on the Bill of Rights. In the middle there is a selection of Black's
opinions arranged chronologically-year by year, and date by date within each
year. Professor Cahn's recent interview with Black on First Amendment
Absolutes ends the substantive part of the book. This is followed by a list of
books and articles, together with tables of cases arranged alphabetically and by
loose categories. The cases themselves are individually edited. With the excep-
tion of those in Barenblatt v. United States,1 all footnotes are excluded and all
citations are deleted, although Dillard has left quotations marks around the
phrases cited. Many sections of opinions are edited out, replaced only by three
dots.
The subtlety of Black's constitutional position is certainly not to be found
in his speeches on the Bill of Rights. In one of them he describes himself as
a "backward country fellow.' 2 And not even the most ardent admirer of the
opinions can find anything to support a conclusion that Black's utterances at
New York University and the American Jewish Congress are sophisticated.
They fail to communicate even the passion of the man behind the judicial
reasoning. There is one speech in which this passion does shine through, where
Black relates the story of a man who gave his life for justice.3 Unfortunately,
this story is omitted. All that the included speeches show is that the justice is
capable of high-flown oratory in support of "absolutes" and "freedoms."
Passion aside, one must witness Black's reasoning in the cases in order to
perceive his greatness. Yet Dillard's editing of the cases often makes it difficult
for the reader to grasp the ultimate basis for conclusions. This result obtains
because of the editor's frequent exclusion of vital steps in legal reasoning, omis-
sion of important elements of scholarship, and naive chronological arrangement
1. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
2. P. 472.
3. Black, Dedicatory Address, 5 J. LEGAL ED. 417 (1953).
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of the cases. Cases are missing which ought to be included. Crucial explanatory
footnotes, citations, and items of reasoning are absent. And the chronological
arrangement often obscures the connections between the cases in which a theory
is developed.
A serious oversight in this selection is the exclusion of Black's aberrational
opinions dealing with military justice. Of course, Korcmnatsu v. United StateS4
is printed. One could not omit Black's very controversial holding that it is
constitutional to put Japanese into "relocation centers" (concentration camps)
on the basis of their race. Dillard's introductory note to the case justifies
such a holding on the ground that Black "will support action by the Federal
Government that normally he would rule out as unconstitutional... when the
Nation is engaged in a war for survival." 5 But no mention is made of the in-
consistency of such a justification with Black's oft-repeated argument that "ne-
cessity" does not justify curtailing civil liberties. And Korematsu is not unique.
Prof. Daniel M. Berman has collected other startling decisions.0 Among them
we find Viereck v. United States,7 in which Black, in dissent, makes an argu-
ment unusual for him: that legislation requiring foreign agents to label their
speeches "propaganda" and of "German origin", "implements rather than de-
tracts from the prized freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment," since it
is designed to enable people to "distinguish between the true and the false." s
In 1949, Wade v. Hunter 9 found the Justice holding for a majority that the
double jeopardy protection of the Constitution does not apply in a court-martial
where, "in the absence of bad faith," the commanding general deems the
tactical situation to require a discontinuance of a trial. Murphy, Douglas and
Rutledge dissented vigorously that "Adaptations of military justice to the
exigencies of tactical situations is the prerogative of the commander in the
field but the price of such expediency is compliance with the Constitution."'"
For reasons of balance Viereck and the other war time cases of the same ilk 1"
ought to have been included in Dillard's collection.
In addition to his omission of significant opinions, Dillard has left out foot-
notes which, in some cases, contain clues to an understanding of the reasoning
which underlie a decision. Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education,2
upholding provision of state funds to defray transportation costs of children
riding buses to Catholic schools, is frequently attacked on the ground that it
4. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
5. P. 113.
6. Berman, Freedom and Mr. Justice Black, The Record After Twenty Years, 25
Mo. L. REv. 155 (1960).
7. 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
8. Id. at 251. Cf. Black's argument in favor of the "spotlight of pitiless publicity"
with Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See also, Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1959).
9. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
10. Id. at 694.
11. E.g., Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946).
12. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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sanctions unconstitutional state aid to religion. But Black answered the objec-
tion in footnote 2: "Although the . . .resolution authorized reimbursement
only for parents of public and Catholic school pupils . . . [there is nothing]
in the record ... which would offer the slightest support to an allegation that
there were any children... who attended or would have attended, but for want
of transportation, any but public and Catholic schools. It will be appropriate
to consider the exclusion of students of private schools operated for profit
when and if it is proved to have occured .... ." By narrowing the case to the
precise problem presented Black was enabled to conclude that religion did not
enter into the formulation or application of the statute and to argue that:
".... we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-
established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New
Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without
regard to their religious belief.' 3 This handling of the issue, by focussing oil
the dispensation of proper benefits rather than on their particular utilization,
shows Black's fine reasoning at its height. It may be unfortunate that the
Justice failed to incorporate this footnote in the text, but this is no excuse for
omitting this item in a presentation of Everson. Similary, in footnote 21 of
Engel v. Vitale,'4 Black began to distinguish between "school prayers" and
other public ceremonies containing references to God.10 Criticisms of his
opinion have neglected this footnote. Mr. Dillard's collection should not have
ignored it. He records in his preface to the opinion merely that the "footnotes
... are rich with historical material."'(;
Black reasons, as these illustrations indicate, by carefully defining the limits
of a problem. His opinions thus require the sort of careful reading which is
often impeded by Dillard's editorial scissors. In Bridges v. California,1" the
Justice overturned a contempt conviction of an alien labor leader who had re-
leased a telegram whose publication might have affected his trial. Dillard neg-
lects to mention that Bridges was an alien and cuts out most of the pivotal legal
argument concerning the "dear and present danger" test. Black treats the test as
partially marking the relation between free speech and societal stability.18 In this
regard the opinion makes an important reference to Thornhill v. Alabama,10
which Dillard has chosen to exclude. Thornhill suggests, Black argues, that
the test is an appropriate guide for determining the constitutional restriction
upon expression where the substantive evil sought to be prevented involves a
destruction of life and property or an invasion of the right to privacy. Black
13. Id. at 16.
14. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
15. "Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the un-
questioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this instance."
Ibid.
16. P. 454.
17. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
18. Cases on clear and present danger "do no more than recognize the minimum con-
pulsion of the Bill of Rights" Id. at 263.
19. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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then uses that analysis to solve the case, arguing that the contempt conviction
must be overturned because the speech sought to be restricted did not interfere
with the basic values of the society that the amendments contemplate. Further,
since the amendments command freedom of speech and establish a societal
structure 20 based on it, Bridges cannot be punished for his speech, despite the
fact that he is not protected as a citizen under the fourteenth amendment.
Eliminate the problem of Bridges' alien status, scissor out the discussion of
what dangers are related to expression under the first amendment, and you
have what Dillard presents: enthusiastic language about the Bill of Rights and
individual freedom. But the case defines Black's notion of the amendments as
"commands"-a notion central to his constitutional outlook. Its supporting
legal reasoning has been omitted from this book.
No collection of a judge's opinions can be expected to provide the full text
of all the other bpinions in each chosen case. But in certain instances the work
of the other justices cannot be eliminated without severely detracting from the
force of the opinion sought to be highlighted. Dillard is too restrictive in his
account of these other judicial reactions. In Ada2nson v. Californiia2 Black
presented his famous thesis that the fourteenth amendment makes the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states. Reed, for the majority, took the more limited
view derived from previous cases; Murphy, in another dissent, argued that
there might be situations which fell so short of conforming to traditional con-
ceptions of fairness as to warrant due process condemnation despite the absence
of a specific Bill of Rights provision. Black stood between them with an argu-
ment which derives from his theory that the amendments are commands.
That theory led him to the view that due process is not a construct of "natural
law", arguably narrow for Reed and broad for Murphy. Instead, Black said,
due process consists of the specific constitutional provisions, applied to the
states via the fourteenth amendment. The impact of Black's conception is
obscured by editing out the tension between Murphy and Reed. After all, the
justice could have concurred with Murphy to reach the desired result. But
his impulse to write a separate opinion came from his view that the content of
the commanding amendments is not changeable. They cannot be e.xpanded by
the "liberals" of Murphy's ilk, nor contracted by "conservatives" following
Reed. Absent the presentation of this tension, Black is again made to appear a
rhetorician instead of a lawyer.
Indeed, Black's rhetoric, read whole and outside its context, is sometimes
extreme. He called the opinion in Feiner v. New York,r2 - "a long step toward
totalitarian authority."23 This declamation rings hollow without an under-
standing of the clash of viewpoints. Only when one realizes that Vinson, for
the majority, thought that a policeman's reasonable estimate that trouble may
20. 'Tree speech [is] ... [a] cherished polic[y] of our civilization." 314 U.S. 252,
260 (1941).
21. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
22. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
23. id. at 323.
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come from speech should be enough to justify his actions in stopping it,
does Black's position that the speaker must be protected first, emerge with
full force. Such a position rests again on Black's notion that the amendments
command a society based on free speech. His dissent is grounded not only on a
reaction to the injustice of convicting Feiner, but also on an objection to grant-
ing to the police the power to determine the boundaries of speech.
These inadequacies are compounded by Dillard's chronological presentation,
which he attempts to justify in the preface merely by stating that "the Bill of
Rights tests have arisen again and again, term after term,... some have been
won and then lost, and others .. . lost and then won. ' 24 But when these
opinions are presented as they are, separated by others from the cases in which
a given theory is developed, out of the context of a conflict on the Court, each
new case seems but an opportunity for reiterating a political credo. The chron-
ological mode of presentation that Dillard has chosen buries the sense of chal-
lenge, accommodation, and evolution within a given area of the law. And what
may be most important is that the book suggests that Black's "credo" is only
"one man's stand" for an ideal rather than the result of working principles
grounded first in a document and then fleshed out in the cases which have de-
veloped that document's model of society.
JONATHAN A. WEISSt
24. P. xiii.
tLegal Staff of Department of Labor.
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